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Like its predecessor, this volume presents important additions to our
stock of statistical time series and throws new light on old problems in the
interpretation of nineteenth century development. This general comment
draws together the parts of the papers which bear on the comparative
study of American and British economic growth and on the mechanism
of long swings.
I shall take first the interesting section of Lebergott's paper dealing with
the role of agriculture in the process of growth in the United States.
"Occupying nearly 75 per cent of our labor force in 1800, farming
occupied over half the labor force until some time between 1880 and
1890....TheKuznets and Galiman estimates of national income are
consistent with this conclusion."Lebergott goes on to say that "an
industry that used from 50 to 90 per cent of the nation's labor input over
the first century of our national existence was surely more likely to make
greater demands on most supplying industries than one that merely
accounted for 5or10 per cent."
Before the above figures are discussed, it will be instructive to look at
the corresponding data for the United Kingdom. Agriculture occupied
36 per cent of the British labor force in 1801, 22 per cent in 1851, and
11 per cent in 1891. By 1871 there were more persons in domestic service
than in farming. Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole have concluded that in
the eighteenth century in the United Kingdom "... thegrowth of the home
market for industrial goods was closely bound up with the fortunes of the
agricultural community, in much the same way as the growth of the
export trade depended on the prosperity Of the primary producers
overseas." The part which agriculture played in the United States during
the nineteeth century (which has been underestimated) was very different
from the increasingly passive and subsidiary role that British agriculture
played in that century. Lebergott cites Leontieff's estimates which show
that a dollar's worth of agricultural output requires far more iron and
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steel output and machinery production than does a dollar's worth of output
generated by textiles or miscellaneous manufacturing or even by the iron
and steel industry itself; and he rightly emphasizes the part of agricultural
investment devoted to land clearing, which entailed copious demands for
breaking plows, axes, scythes, and hoes. Added to this were the inno-
vations which made farming more capital-intensive and the system of land
ownership which gave owner-occupiers an incentive to invest liberally in
the land.
To make sense of the differing roles of agriculture in the economic
growth of the United States and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth
century, it is essential to contrast the status of the two countries in the
international economy. Instead of seeking an interpretation along these
lines, Lebergott jumped to the conclusion that his data "... indicateonly
one thing: U.S. experience reveals no higher law at work forcing a decline
of the share of the labor force in agriculture during economic growth."
This assertion is unwarranted. It can be shown to be wrong both theoret-
ically and empirically.
The deeper questions raised by these data could have been more
fruitfully dealt with if the time series had been handled according to a
different chronology.This criticism applies to other papers as well.
Instead of presenting the data mechanically for periods such as 1840—60,
1860—80, 1880—1910, etc., would it not have been more instructive to
arrange them according to the chronology of the long swing? Several
papers in this volume, e.g., those by Gailman, Lebergott, and Gottlieb,
have confirmed the statistical findings of Kuznets, Abramovitz, and others
in this field.It would have been an advantage to relate these to similar
findings for the United Kingdom and other countries.
For example, Galiman shows that during periods of rising or peak
long-swing rates of advance for construction, the share of construction in
gross domestic capital formation remained roughly constant, whereas
during periods of declining or trough rates of advance, the share of
construction fell sharply (Tables 4 and 6). Lebergott, in his comparative
analysis of the United States and the United Kingdom in the period
1880—1910, makes the point that the "...contrastingmigration flows
plus variations in the rate of natural increase generated differing manpower
requirements in residential construction. The induced effects on highway
and public building construction, on plant. for making steel, brick, and
lumber can be surmised, although not measured at present."Gottlieb
demonstrates an oscillation in the ratios of residential to total building
—a rise in residential booms and a fall in residential contractions. This
confirms Kuznets' results for the years 1870—1920, but Gottlieb shows that
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Iwould like to suggest that an approach centering on the interaction
between the United States and the United Kingdom would give a more
satisfactory explanation of some of the phenomena. Let me summarize
some of the statistical findings on this process of interaction between
1870 to 1913.
1. There were long swings in additions to population and internal
migration in the United States which were inverse to those in the United
Kingdom.
2. In the United States there was an inverse relation between long
swings in population-sensitive capital formation (i.e., nonfarm residential
construction and durable capital expenditure by railroads) and long swings
in other capital formation (i.e., net changes in inventories, producer durable
equipment, and foreign claims) and in the flow of goods to consumers.
3. The long swings in British domestic capi.tal formation were positively
related to those in British additions to population and inverse to those in
population-sensitive capital formation in the United States.
4. Long swings in British domestic capital formation were synchronized
with long swings in American "other" capital formation and exports.
5.Thelong swings in British and European emigration and British
capital exports were synchronized with the long swings in population-
sensitive capital formation and internal migration in the United States.
6. There were long swings in American imports at constant prices.
7. The gross volume of population-sensitive capital formation in the
United States was over 40 per cent of total capital formation in the 1870's
and even in the first decade of the twentieth century it was still 25 per cent
of the total.
There is a strong disposition among American economists to seek an
explanation of every feature of American long swings exclusively in terms
of forces operating within the United States itself.2 The essence of the
causal sequence suggested by Kuznets can be put as follows. Starting with
long swings in the flow of goods to consumers in the United States, we
have—after some lag—swings in immigration, additions to population,
and population-sensitive capital formation; this causes inverted swings
in other capital formation and additions to flow of goods to consumers,
and the latter then induces a new inflow of population.3 The weakness of
2RichardA. Easterlin's attempt to show that the inverse relation between long
swings in the United States and the United Kingdom in the period 1870-1913 does not
exist can hardly be said to succeed ("Influences in European Overseas Emigration
before World War I," EconomicDevelopmentand Cultural Change, April 1961,
pp. 347—348). He himself admits that "... tospeak of conclusions on the basis of
this preliminary reconnaissance would be presumptuous" (p. 348).
Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing, Princeton
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this model is that the whole thing turns on a suspiciously long "lag"
between additions to the flow of goods to consumers and additions to
population. Kuznets has to ask us". .. toallow for a long lag that would,
in a sense, turn negative into positive association."4 Surely this is going
too far. We are dealing here with long swings with a span of about twenty
years. There is something arbitrary about singling out one case of negative
association among many and treating it as a long lag.If it is right to do
this in one case, why not in others too?
Much needs to be done before the mechanism of long swings can be
satisfactorily explained. I am still convinced that these problems can best
be resolved on the basis of a two-country model.5 This kind of analysis may
be briefly summarized as follows.
Let there be two countries: A, an industrialized creditor, and B, a
country underpopulated but rich in natural resources. Each country is
divided into two sectors—domestic capital construction and export.
There is free mobility of factors between the sectors and' between the
countries.Let the word "period" refer to either the upswing or the
downswing phase of the construction cycle, i.e., half the span of a long
swing .Thefollowing relationships are assumed:
a. The level of activity in the export sector of one country depends on
the marginal efficiency of capital in the capital construction sector of the
other country in the same period.
b. The export capacity of each country is a function of the rate of
expansion achieved in the capital construction sector of that country in
the previous period.
c. A major fraction of total capital formation is population-sensitive.
d. Changes in population growth are dominated by changes in the net
external migration balance.
Let us suppose that an outflow of population takes place from A to B.
This stimulates activity in population-sensitive capital formation in B
and retards it in A. The upswing in B attracts a flow of capital funds from
A and this in turn stimulates A's export sector. Thus in A there is a
downswing in population-sensitive capital formation and an upswing in
exports.Meanwhile in B the construction boom triggered off by the
inflowing population gives rise to an internal suction of factors. There
are two phases in this upswing in B.First, there is a rapid build-up of
population-sensitive capital formation as an effect of population increase;
in this phase, the boom is supply-determined and there is a widening of
the capital structure.In the second phase, limitational factors become
ibid., p. 347.
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importantand the wage-price spiral starts. The rise inwages will now
lead to renewed immigration of labor, and the inflow is now demand-
determined.
Through the interaction of the multiplier and the accelerator (with lags),
the construction boom in B reaches its downturn. It is a crucial matter
whether the timing of this downturn in B is dependent on what is simul-
taneously happening in A.Statistical analysis of British long swings
suggests that upturns in home construction preceded downturns in the
export sector, and upturns in the export sector preceded downturns in
home construction.6 If this is so, the downturn of the boom in B is deter-
mined by the revival in population-sensitive capital formation in A.
Factors and loanable funds in A now move into the reviving construction
sector; migration into towns in A takes the place of emigration from A
to B. The upswing in construction in A is accompanied by a downswing
in population-sensitive capital formation and a revival in the export
sector in B. This goes on until the upturn of the construction cycle is
reached in B, which is a signal for a revival in exports and then a downturn
in home construction in A. Space does not allow an account of the price
and balance-of-payments implications of these inverse cycles. The model
can demonstrate that international migration, through its influence on
changes in population growth and population-sensitive capital formation,
is the most plausible explanation of inverse long swings.
Within such a framework one can see more clearly the external deter-
minants of the components and sources of output growth in the United
States.Let me now return to the role of agriculture which I mentioned
earlier.I would interpret the evolution as follows. Each upswing phase
of the long cycle in the United States saw a great extension of railways,
construction, roads, land clearing, etc.;the capacity thus built up
fulfilled itself in large additions to agricultural output in the next period,
i.e., the downswing phase of the long cycle.It was in these latter phases,
coinciding with the capital formation booms in the United Kingdom,
that the United States had its upswings in additions to the flow of goods
to consumers and to net claims on foreign countries. In this connection,
it is significant that crude and manufactured foodstuffs and crude materials
comprised as much as 80 per cent of total United States exports even as
late as 1890; the corresponding figures for 1856 and 1875 were 84 and
80 per cent, respectively. The major market was the United Kingdom.
There was a very high industrial input (drawing heavily on the metal
industries) into agriculture and new settlement; the United States was
meeting not only the rapidly increasing demand of her fast-growing
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population but was also undermining the obsolete agrarian economies of
Europe. In the 1880's European agriculture felt the boomerang effects of
earlier railroad and steamship investment; although wages on the wheat
farms of northwestern United States in 1887 were four times as high as
in Rhenish Prussia, nevertheless the cost of production in Prussia was
double the American (80 cents a bushel against 40 cents).William N.
Parker's illuminating paper on the increase in productivity in the produc-
tion of small grains is very relevant in this context.
The economic interplay between the New World and the Old entailed
a vast expansion of remarkably efficient agriculture in the United States,
and its upsurges of output and exports were most prominent during the
downswings of the long cycle. The impact on the rural economies of
Europe meant an intensification of population pressure and renewed
outflows of migrants across the Atlantic.The mass rural exodus of
"new" immigrants from southern and eastern Europe between 1900 and
1913 must be attributed partly to the delayed force of New World
innovations reaching back to the Old World with disruptive power. In
Schumpeter's words,". ..thestory of the way in which civilized humanity
got and fought cheap bread ...isthe story of American railroads and
American machinery."7
In seeking to explain the complex process of output growth over the
last century, we must as economists and economic historians pay due
attention to the complex interaction between major economies from one
period to the next. Analysis which tends tO be inward-looking is apt to
miss the interesting clues.
'Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Vol. 1, New York, 1939, p. 319.Output of Final Products